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ABSTRACT

FROM THE HEADLINES: A TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL POLARIZATION
AND DISCORD IN TIMES OF PANDEMIC ACROSS A CENTURY IN THE UNITED
STATES

Alexa C. DeMarco
Microbiology and Molecular Biology Department
Bachelor of Science

Within the past century, three major pandemics have affected the United States –
the Spanish Flu, AIDS, and Covid-19. Each of these pandemics has tested the capabilities
of the public health sector and the social resilience of the population. Scientists have
studied the viruses and implemented public health measures to limit viral transmission, but
the social responses to these preventative measures proved to be difficult to predict and
control. The dissonance and polarization between the public health initiatives and the
response of the general public in the most recent pandemic was apparent. Was this a pattern
in other pandemics? Was there a time where public policy and social responses were more
closely aligned? Was social polarization, or the tendency of modern-day society to ground
themselves in an extreme point of view on current public health issues, evident in other
pandemics, or was this a new phenomenon? Through the novel lens of newspaper articles,
this thesis will shed light on the tension between public policy and social responses in the
last century in the United States.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.A Summary of questions addressed in this study
Within the past century, three major pandemics have plagued the human population in the
United States – the Spanish Flu, HIV/AIDS, and Covid-19. Each, in its own way, has tested
American ingenuity, public health response capabilities, and social resilience. Scientists
throughout the century have studied the viruses, attempted to create vaccines that will
combat them, and implemented preventative measures to control viral spread. However,
some measures cannot be mapped or quantified. By nature, pandemics are uniquely social
events. Just as the propagation and transmission of a communicable disease requires
contact between individuals, the growth or retreat of a pandemic relies on large-scale social
agreements. As the social, population-focused aspects of pandemics are much more
difficult to normalize, measures must be taken to organize the public health response.
Pandemics inevitably call upon public resources to guide, direct, and moderate societal
responses. The polarization of opinions and responses to public health initiatives during
Covid-19 has led me to consider how others had responded to pandemics in the past. Was
there a time where people would follow public health requirements with less dissonance?
How has the alignment between public policy and social responses varied over time in
relation to these three pandemics? Are certain trends or cultural attitudes evident in the
reporting from those time periods? Was social polarization, or the tendency of modern-day
society to ground themselves in an extreme point of view on current public health issues,
evident in other pandemics, or was this a new phenomenon? This paper will examine the
three main U.S. pandemics of the last century, attempting to shed light on the tension
between public policy and social responses through the novel lens of newspaper articles.
1.B Analytical framework
To approach the questions outlined above, I first identified a prominent news source that
existed and reported during the peaks of the pandemics of the last century – the New York
Times – which would serve as a constant to make the analysis more objective. In my
preparation of this news source, I considered the biases which would come from doing a
comparative report of this nature. Any prominent news outlet would have its biases, but
the news section, (not the econd n section) of the Times, has been considered a highly
reputable news outlet since its establishment in September of 1851.
Having selected this source, I could begin my comparative analysis of the titles of news
reports from the New York Times during the peaks of the pandemics. I selected over 100
news articles from the peak years of each pandemic, ensuring that these selections covered
the reports for a minimum of two years per pandemic. I selected time periods that were
relevant to both the 1918 pandemic and AIDS pandemic, including two years for each. The
sheer number of reports during the COVID-19 pandemic required that I use a different
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approach. As of August 1st, 2022, the New York Times had published over 26,000 articles
under their specific COVID-19 tab. Given the huge sample size, I realized there would
have to be other restrictions on those 26,000+ articles in order to obtain a manageable
sample size. I filtered out the opinion articles, which were not pertinent to the samples for
this case study, then selected only the COVID articles that were under the Health section
of the Times. I selected only the first 10 articles per month of the pandemic, as there were
still 1,344 results under the Health subsection of the COVID-19 tab for the time period
between January 1st, 2020, and December 31st, 2021. These restrictions resulted in a
reasonable sample size of 240 articles on which I could carry out the analysis.
Given the restrictions previously described in this section, the number of samples per
pandemic, as well as the dates included in each sample, are listed below.
Table 1: Sample sizes in relation to pandemic timelines
Pandemic
1918 Pandemic
AIDS
COVID-19

Date range of
pandemic
01/1918 – 04/1920
06/1981 – ongoing
12/2019 – ongoing

Dates included in
sample
01/1918 – 04/1920
08/1983 – 10/1985
01/2020 – 12/2021

Number of samples
111
206
240

These sources were analyzed as non-subjectively as possible under certain criteria, which
will be outlined later in this paper.
1.C Terminology and a few words of clarification
To make the results of the study as transparent as possible, I would like to define some
dates and terms before diving into the body of research, as well as give a brief overview of
each pandemic.
Pandemic: the outbreak of a disease affecting multiple countries or
continents (a large geographical region).
Epidemic: a disease outbreak affecting a specific, smaller
geographical area.
Social response: The term social response, as used in this thesis,
refers to the response of individuals (or many members of society)
to public health announcements and preventative measures of viral
spread. It encompasses cultural trends, responses, and attitudes, and
relates to the willingness of the public to embrace public health
policy. Those responses, as well as individuals’ willingness to
comply with public health policy, are related to demographic
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parameters including but not limited to political affiliation,
upbringing, ethnicity, income level, and geography.
Public Policy: The term public policy, as used in this paper, refers
to the announcements, regulations and laws implemented within
society by public health officials and others to promote overall
social and physical wellness of the nation.
Social polarization: Social polarization, as used in this paper, refers
to the polarization, or separation of individuals into highly
differentiated opinions, caused by political ideology, opinions, or
other media sources.
Technology: the means by which communications are transmitted
electronically, including but not limited to the internet, online news
sources, phones, email, text messaging, Facebook messaging,
Instagram direct messages, and Twitter.
Social media: social media refers to the use of virtual communities
(via Instagram, YouTube, Facebook, WhatsApp, TikTok, Snapchat,
or Twitter), to share information or ideas, interact with others,
and/or post original content and personal opinions.
1918 Pandemic: Otherwise known as the Spanish Flu, the 1918
Influenza Pandemic lasted from 1918-1920 in the United States and
its effects can still be seen today.
H1N1 Influenza: The virus responsible for the 1918 Pandemic.
AIDS: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, the disease caused
by HIV. The AIDS epidemic, which became a worldwide pandemic,
was first discovered in 1981.
HIV: The virus responsible for AIDS, which interferes with an
individual’s immune system and ability to fight infection.
COVID-19: COVID-19, otherwise known as the coronavirus
pandemic, was the most recent global pandemic originating in
Wuhan, China.
SARS-CoV-2: The virus responsible for the COVID-19 pandemic.
Mortality rate: the number of deaths in a population (due to a
specific pathogen) in a certain time frame.
Transmission rate: the rate at which a virus spreads from one host to
another.
Non-pharmaceutical interventions: Non-pharmaceutical
interventions, or NPIs, are often the public health sector’s first line
3

of defense against unknown pathogens. As the name suggests, they
are less invasive measures than vaccinations, as they provide nonpharmaceutical options for preventing viral spread. These
measures include physical distancing, isolating (or quarantining)
those who are ill, and temporarily closing public areas (such as
restaurants, schools, churches, etc.) which could serve as areas for
viral transmission of airborne viruses.
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Table 2: Comparative overview of selected pandemics in the last century (worldwide data)
Pandemic

Virus

Duration

Cases

Mechanism of
Transmission
Airborne,
droplet
transmission

1918
Pandemic

H1N1
Influenza

1918 1920

500
million

AIDS

HIV

1981 –
present

55.9 –
110
million

Sexual
transmission,
particularly
through
homosexual
sex, blood
transfusions,
vaginal
delivery,
genital
secretions,
sharps, breast
milk,
intrauterine
maternal
blood

COVID19

SARSCoV-2

2019 –
present

576
million

Droplets,
fomites,
indirect
contact
transmission.
Airborne
transmission
is most
common
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Symptoms
Pneumonia
and
respiratory
failure,
permanent
damage to
respiratory
tree
Early
symptoms
resemble
those of a
common
cold, but
after
asymptomat
ic period
result in
inability to
generate
immune
response

Fever, dry
cough, and
bilateral
pneumonia

Total
Deaths
50
million

27.2 –
47.8
million

6.4
million

Risk
Groups
Individuals
under the
age of 5,
between
20-40 years
old, and 65
years and
older
Gay or
bisexual
men to
have sex
with men,
injection
drug users,
ethnic
minorities,
older
adults,
individuals
in the
criminal
justice
system,
individuals
who have
unprotected
sex, and
youth,
especially
in
developing
countries
Immunoco
mpromised
individuals,
those with
existing
conditions.
Risk
groups
changed
over time
with the
new strains
of the
SARSCoV-2
virus.

2. REVIEW OF TIMELINE AND IMPACTS OF THREE PANDEMICS
2.A The 1918 Pandemic
The Influenza pandemic of 1918 remains a reference to which many of the modern
epidemics and endemics are compared (1, 2). Though tragic, it provided understanding for
the basis of pandemic spread. Many details of the virus’ origins are unknown, but the
implications of what has been discovered cannot be understated. Centuries prior to the 1918
pandemic, many illnesses stemming from unknown causes were given the name
“Influenza” by the public. By the time the Spanish Flu had been identified, three main
categories of Influenza had been identified – A, B, and C (2). Influenza A viruses became
particularly relevant to modern society in the 20th century.
Shortly following the First World War, almost one third of the worldwide population
exhibited symptoms of a new disease. The disease was more infectious and fatal than any
Influenza of the past, simultaneously infecting both humans and swine. Its severity was
evident in the fatalities from 1918-1919. Total deaths are unknown (3), but estimates range
from 50-100 million worldwide, and approximately 675,000 in the U.S. alone – more than
the World War (4). Due to its severe pathogenicity, individuals at the time doubted the
virus responsible for the pandemic could be Influenza, but research done in the 1930s
linked related Influenza viruses isolated from pigs and humans to the original virus of 1918
(3).
The Spanish Flu pandemic came in three main waves within a year, an unprecedented
pattern at the time. The first, a mild wave in the spring of 1918, caused few deaths. More
fatal waves followed shortly thereafter in the Fall and Winter months of 1918-1919,
causing the majority of deaths (3).
The origins of the virus remain unknown. Other respiratory disease epidemics were
spreading in 1915 but connecting those events to the 1918 pandemic proved to be a difficult
task. Modern researchers are unable to identify them as “precursors” for the pandemic
without more substantial evidence to support those claims. Researchers are also unable to
define the geographical region from which the virus originated. Most viruses of the era
originated in Asia, due to the high probability of gene rearrangement in areas where pigs,
ducks, and humans are in close contact with each other, but each phylogenetic analysis
done since the pandemic has proved unsuccessful at placing the virus in a specific locale
(3).
The virus responsible for the 1918 Pandemic, H1N1, is still wreaking havoc on the world,
and is considered the mother of all pandemics. Each Influenza A pandemic since its time
has been identified as a descendant of the virus (3). In its own way, the H1N1 virus is still
circulating today.
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2.B The HIV Epidemic
Sixty years later, in the 1980s, a new virus disrupted modern understanding of disease,
sparking a period of confusion surrounding the origins of a new virus – HIV, or Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (5). This virus was unlike others seen before. In 1981, scientists
at various universities and research centers around the United States started reporting
curious cases of opportunistic pathogens causing disease in previously healthy individuals
– mainly homosexual men (6, 7). As time went on, more cases of curious diseases were
reported – all of which were caused by pathogens which normally did not cause disease in
patients, with the exception of immunocompromised individuals. A jump in reported cases
of Pneumocystis carinii and Kaposi’s sarcoma, a rare cancer, as well as other opportunistic
pathogens, were particularly alarming to scientists at the time (7), but ultimately proved to
be key factors in determining the mechanisms of this new virus (8).
Initial epidemiological studies revealed little connecting the backgrounds of the infected
individuals besides a general trend of homosexual behavior and similar geographical
locations (7). Early laboratory studies also revealed little about the virus’ nature, as the
sequences of each isolated virus were vastly different. Over time, the infected population
included more than just homosexual men. Partners of those individuals, recipients of blood
transfusions, intravenous drug abusers, and Haitian immigrants were all included in the
population (9). These infection routes suggested sexual transmission as the virus’ mode of
action, as well as the virus’ characteristic delayed pathogenicity (6, 7). In time, scientists
recognized that the common factor in each case was some kind of disfunction in Tlymphocytes, and the condition was given a name – Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome, or AIDS (6).
The AIDS pandemic differs from the 1918 Flu pandemic and the Covid-19 pandemic in
that it is an ongoing issue. Although initial cases date back to 1981, the pandemic peak, or
point at which the number of new cases hit a maximum before declining, occurred in 1995
– 14 years after the start of the pandemic. That pandemic peak was seven times as long as
both the Spanish Flu and COVID-19 pandemics. HIV, unlike Influenza and SARS-CoV2, is not an airborne-transmitted virus (10). It exhibits long incubation periods with slow
onset of symptoms, which are not resolved by the immune system of the infected
individuals. Although research has been done to find a vaccine and a cure for those with
AIDS, only treatments to alleviate disease severity are available at this point, and most of
the measures taken to prevent viral spread involve educating the public about prevention
(11-16). AIDS affects specific risks groups (as found in the table above) at rates much
higher than those not found in risk groups (10-21). The stigma associated with the patterns
of HIV viral spread and the continued prevalence of this stigma in society are also
particularly damaging to these risk groups, generating much fear for individuals who test
positive for HIV (22).
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2.C COVID-19
One century after the Influenza pandemic of 1918 and almost 40 years after the discovery
and identification of HIV, the Covid-19 coronavirus pandemic arose. This virus, though
similar to other beta-coronaviruses of the past, resulted in complete global shutdown.
During the past 20 years, the world has experienced three distinct outbreaks of
coronaviruses. Their contrasting stories provide interesting content for consideration. The
first of the outbreaks occurred in 2003 in China. The Chinese responded quickly to the
2003 SARS-CoV strain, practically shutting down the nation and limiting spread. By the
time the pandemic had ended, 8098 individuals had been infected and 744 of those
individuals had died, resulting in a mortality rate of 9.6%. The second epidemic was the
2012 MERS-CoV strain, which primarily affected Saudi Arabia. This strain was highly
consolidated, but the deadliest, as 858 of the 2491 infected individuals died – resulting in
a 34.4% mortality rate. Contrary to public portrayal, the agent responsible for the most
recent pandemic, SARS-CoV2, was symptomatically milder than its predecessors.
Although a startling 562,672,324 individuals have been infected worldwide, only 1.13%
of those individuals died (23).
Although its origins have been disputed, the original SARS-CoV-2 outbreak occurred in
the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market in Wuhan, China in December of 2019 (24). The
market was shut down shortly thereafter, but thousands of people in China were reportedly
affected within January. As of the beginning of February, almost 30,000 cases and 565
deaths had been documented (24). The virus had spread to over 25 countries. As previously
stated, similar coronaviruses have been seen over the years, but none so widespread as
SARS-CoV-2, the virus responsible for the COVID-19 pandemic (24). Over time, new
variants of this strain were identified with varying pathogenicity. As of July 20th, 2022, the
World Health Organization had reported 562 million cases, with 6.3 million deaths
worldwide, and 1.03 million deaths in the U.S. (23). The identification of the SARS-CoV2 virus was much faster than the pandemics of the past but combating the disease has
proved to be much more difficult than expected.
2.D Why compare these pandemics?
Looking at the raw data of the pandemics, it seems like there are few things which connect
them, besides their pandemic nature. Just as the core attributes of these pandemics vary,
one would expect public policy and social responses to differ as well. Due to the different
natures of the pandemics, as well as the different times periods in which they affected the
U.S. population, a side-by-side comparison is a difficult comparison to make, as well as an
imperfect one. The pandemics lasted different lengths of time and affected different groups
of people. Those risks groups have changed over time. Public health measures can assuage,
but not completely remove viral threats. Public health interventions for the 1918 pandemic
seemed to have worked well, but their implementation had varying results in the most
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recent COVID-19 pandemic. Given all these differences, a comparative, side-by-side case
study on these U.S. pandemics would be misleading if we were to neglect to state these
differences. It is possible that these differences are responsible for the results of this study.
However, if readers understand that these viral pandemics differ in many of their
characteristics, and acknowledge those differences, a comparison of the journalistic
reporting on these pandemics may provide critical insights into the social side of
pandemics, and how those social responses are evolving through time. It is with this
discretionary warning in mind that my discoveries can now be presented.

3. TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF REPORTING ON THE THREE PANDEMICS IN
THE NEW YORK TIMES
3.A Framework of Textual Analysis
Before reporting the findings of this case study, it is pertinent to lay forth the guidelines
for this textual analysis. As previously stated, the sample size for the reports on each
pandemic was determined by two factors – first, the duration of each pandemic, and second,
the number of articles published during those time periods. Table 1 (found above on page
2) details those selections, as well as the number of articles in each sample. Having been
selected, the articles were organized chronologically, and the headlines of each article
within the sample were analyzed subjectively on three separate scales of 1-5, found below,
along with their corresponding explanations.
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The headlines were first analyzed on the theme or overarching content of their headlines.
Does the article seem to be research-focused (or focused on the science of public health
policies), or based on societal matters? What was the “news” reporting on, primarily? Did
the subjects of their articles lean to one side, or did the material tend to stay somewhere in
between?
The second analysis tapped into the social polarization of the times. Did the title assume
unanimity in the readers or that they were at discord with each other? Were the reporters
of the time reporting to a polarized populous?
The third and final analysis aimed to determine whether the reports provided commentary
on a politician/health official’s response to pandemic measures, or if the Times reported on
the policy itself. One of the most obvious themes in the article headlines that was revealed
upon initial visual analysis, was the politicization of content during the pandemics. Rather
than report on the directions or policies of a public health official, the stories seemed to
report more about the stance of the officials themselves, as individuals. This scale would
provide more concrete insight into that theme.
3.B 1918 FLU PANDEMIC

(49)
Figure 1: Photograph of individuals in masks during the 1918 Flu Pandemic

3.B.1 Public Health Measures during the 1918 Flu Pandemic
Early on in the pandemic of 1918, non-pharmaceutical interventions, otherwise known as
NPIs, became the nation’s first line of defense against the unknown pathogen. Early
implementation of NPIs, such as physical distancing, isolating those who were ill, and
closing workplaces and schools were directly correlated with decreased viral spread during
the pandemic, and lowered overall death rates (25). The timing of these interventions
10

affected their success, especially in an era in which methods of communication were
inconsistent to say the least. The implementation of NPIs differed by city, by region, and
even by country, as early methods of mass communication limited the reach and speed at
which news arrived. As individuals were unable to receive important health information at
once, the individuals who lagged behind (due to technological disadvantages or personal
agency) experienced greater death rates than those who didn’t experience those same
delays (26).
Few public health statements from the era survived the effects of time, but letters and
telegrams from military men convey the alarming nature of the issue for soldiers and
citizens of the time. In a telegram dated October 11th, 1918, from one citizen, Cato Sells,
to his leaders in Washington, D.C., he expressed,
“Spanish Influenza of Virulent type spreading over country with alarming
rapidity, many [superintendents] report serious conditions[.] Indian pupils
at our schools and Indians old and young on reservations must be given best
care and protection possible[.] [Important] that inhabited school buildings
be kept at uniform temperature… sixty eight to seventy degrees [with] good
ventilation maintained and all forms of detrimental exposure of pupils very
carefully avoided particularly during illness and convalescent period….
[Allow] no intermingling of pupils or employers under conditions of
overcrowding and to the extent you find [it] desirable isolation [or]
quarantine… cooperate with local health officials and service physician
when conditions justify (27).”
Sells’ attitude, evident in this excerpt from his telegram to D.C., seemed to be a common
one from the time. Although citizens often had limited information from the government
or public health leaders, they trusted in the little information they received from their
leaders and in modern medicine to fight against the pandemic.
In some cases, agency proved to be a challenge in preventing transmission. As Dr.
Copeland, the Health Commissioner of New York stated in an interview with the Times,
“At the end of the fourth week of the epidemic in Boston, the death rate was 101 for each
thousand of the population; in the City of Washington, it was 109; in Baltimore, 149; in
Philadelphia, 158; in New York City 50. That is a very fine record by comparison (28).”
When questioned about the difference between New York’s public health response and that
of other places, he remarked, “this city has had an efficient Health Department for twenty
years;… for those years, there has been a constant effort to popularize the conditions that
made for health;
… since the first anti-tuberculosis campaign there has been constant insistence on the
necessity for ventilation; we have improved our tenement-house laws; bad as they are at
times, our streets are clean in the main – and in and out-of-the-way parts of the city clean,
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and reeking sellers and filth-breeding places have been wiped out. The fact that the death
rate was kept down so low, and that the epidemic did not assume more alarming
proportions, is a wonderful tribute to the city’s health control in years past (28).”

3.B.2 Textual Analysis of Newspaper Headlines from the 1918 Flu Pandemic
Upon analyzation, sources from The New York Times’ reports during the 1918 pandemic
supported the events and pandemic patterns outlined above, both quantitatively and
qualitatively. Overall, the headlines reflected a calm, rational public. They expressed
concern, but were fairly neutral in tone, seeming ‘matter of fact’ about most issues, even
alarming issues like the mortality rates. The following headline, which was the first to
directly reference the ‘Spanish epidemic’ within the article body, is evidence of this
pragmatic and rational tone.

(29)
In subsequent reporting, as soldiers and others began to experience Influenza themselves,
this composed tone established in early articles from the pandemic continued to
overshadow the unfortunate news. The following sample of headlines from the pandemic
provide a reference to the pragmatic attitude and lack of polarization evident in the article
titles.

(51)
(50)

(53)

(52)
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(57)

(56)

(55)

(54)

As seen in the table below, quantitatively, the reports during these years of infection and
disease within the United States were primarily research and policy-focused, emphasizing
a united population. Although subjective to a degree, the data gathered from quantitative
ratings about the focus of the headlines highlights these important details. The headlines
exhibited a score of 2.19 in favor of a research focus, 1.63 for a unified populous, and a
score of 1.55 for policy-focused, not person-focused reporting. Although there was a sense
of urgency in some cases, it seemed that news sources were mirroring the attitude of many
of the public health officials of the time, like Dr. Copeland, who stated, “My aim was to
prevent panic, hysteria, mental disturbance, and thus to protect the public from the
condition of mind that in itself predisposes to physical ills. I attempted to maintain the
morale of New York City (28).”
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3.C HIV/AIDS PANDEMIC

(58)
Figure 2: Photograph of individuals protesting unfair treatment of citizens with
AIDS during the HIV/AIDS Pandemic

3.C.1 Public Health Response during the HIV/AIDS Pandemic
From the moment they identified the viral characteristics of HIV, it became clear the virus
the Public Health Department was dealing with this time around was going to be different
from the last. NPIs and other traditional public health methods for dealing with infectious
viruses were not effective as researchers didn’t initially know the cause of what they were
dealing with. The sporadic nature of the cases, the confounding, lifelong pattern of spread,
and the specific risk groups identified early in the pandemic created a stigma that has
attached itself to HIV ever since (22). That negative stigma increased the risk of
discrimination for all those who were infected, further complicating the public health
response, and resulting in an emotionally charged pandemic where individuals’ opinions
played more of a role (30). Combined with the taboo nature of the transmission
mechanisms of HIV, AIDS became a difficult topic for public health officials to explain in
an open manner, and even more difficult to combat as their early efforts to prevent spread
seemed to provoke existing societal issues even further (26).
In the early days of HIV, no one knew anything for certain, so people did what they thought
would help. As more information about the virus was discovered, public health officials
suggested additional changes. However, given the fact that public health officials were
often unaware of infected individuals’ conditions until nine years after exposure, these
changes often occurred too late for some individuals. Contact tracing, a traditional method
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implemented by the public health sector, was limited in its effectiveness, and the virus’
ability to hide in a long asymptomatic period resulted in affected individuals continuing to
give blood transfusions, unknowingly spreading the virus.
Over the course of the pandemic, San Francisco mayors shut down public baths. Public
health officials cautioned dentists and doctors against seeing patients with AIDS. They
banned individuals from bathhouses and shut down public gathering places. They made
needles harder to access. Some health officials in certain states even reported lists of
infected individuals, taking away the confidentiality of their medical information and
calling privacy issues into questions. The resulting effects of these actions were often
unpredictable and damaging to the mission of the nation’s public health leaders.
As public health officials and government agencies awarded money to individuals and
groups researching HIV, the public health response gradually improved, but those changes
took time. Increased education on HIV/AIDS diminished the stigma over time, and public
health officials took a more preventative, educative approach rather than a treatment one,
resulting in a more robust, trained public health response to the virus (25,31). Eventually,
new laws were enacted, and the public was better educated on the virus (32). The search
for a vaccine against HIV continues today, as the public health sector educates the public
about prevention.

3.C.2 Textual Analysis of Newspaper Headlines from the HIV/AIDS Pandemic
The first three headlines in the sample from the AIDS Pandemic provide a glimpse into
just how different this pandemic was from the 1918 Flu pandemic.
(60)

(59)

(61)
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These three headlines, though brief, demonstrate three important attributes of the
characteristic reporting of the AIDS pandemic. First, the blatant discord within the
population, evident in the language of the headlines. Diction like “it takes more than
money” and “faulty” suggest a more argumentative, discontented population, which was
reflected in the quantitative analysis, as well. In contrast with the pandemic of 1918, in
which the sample headlines scored an average of 1.63 in favor of a unified population, the
AIDS headline sample, which was almost double the size of the Spanish Flu sample, scored
a 3.22 in favor of discord.
The second pattern evident in both the qualitative and quantitative analyses of the AIDS
pandemic headlines was the switch from policy-focused writing to reporting about
individuals from popular culture or politics.

(62)

Rock Hudson became one of the many faces of AIDS, but he wasn’t the only one. Reports
about specific politicians and individuals from the public health sector, rather than their
public health announcements, dominated the new age of reporting. The AIDS pandemic’s
score of 3.20 juxtaposed the 1918 pandemic’s score of 1.55 – a significant change.
The third, perhaps most important and notable change that occurred in the reporting on this
pandemic was the focus on stigma and fear, not science. In the 1918 pandemic, on average,
most articles scored around a 2.19, favoring the research and science behind the health
policies being enforced at the time. Although headlines like the one below existed during
the ongoing AIDS pandemic, they were few and far between.
(63)

The large majority of article headlines, rather than express progress being made on the
research-side of the pandemic, reflected a new phenomenon – frustration, and more
importantly, fear, related to the many unknowns of the pandemic. The clear, significant
switch to a social focus score of 3.39 was the highest of any of the pandemics, providing
more concrete evidence of the difference in reporting and tone in the second half of the
century. Titles, like those below, seemed to feed the fear of the public, and their inability
to control the outcome of the pandemic without more concrete evidence.
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(45)
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3.D COVID-19 PANDEMIC

(67)
Figure 3: Photograph of hospital workers in the COVID-19 Pandemic

3.D.1 Public Health Response from the COVID-19 Pandemic
The saying goes, “practice makes perfect,” and as far as the viral phenomenon goes, has
proved to be true – at least partially. Three different strains of COVID have affected the
world within the past 20 years. Their differing public health responses provide interesting
contrast for consideration.
The Chinese responded quickly to the 2003 SARS-CoV strain, practically shutting down
the nation and limiting spread. By the time the pandemic had ended, 8098 individuals had
been infected and 744 of those individuals had died, resulting in a mortality rate of 9.6%.
The 2012 MERS-CoV strain affecting Saudi Arabia was highly consolidated, but the
deadliest, as 858 of the 2491 infected individuals died – resulting in a 34.4% mortality rate.
In the most recent pandemic, SARS-CoV-2 was in fact symptomatically milder than the
coronaviruses in those previous outbreaks. Although a startling 562,672,324 individuals
have been infected worldwide, only 1.13% of those individuals died (23).
Due to the worldwide nature of SARS-CoV2, the juxtaposing public health
recommendations of different entities resulted in a confused public. Some countries
experienced less viral transmission and mortality than others. China was one of the
countries that experienced less death due to the effectiveness of their public health
response.
Following the 2003 coronavirus epidemic, the Chinese had done “pandemic planning” in
order to apply the lessons they had learned from their previous experience (33), including
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restricting wildlife marketing, emphasizing early detection, creating a rapid information
network for SARS, and doing extra training for their healthcare workers (34). After the
2003 pandemic, they had started working on a vaccine and studying COVID in depth. This
made their response to the most recent strain much faster (33).
Not all countries were quite as well-equipped to combat the pandemic as quickly as the
Chinese – the United States being one of them. The lessons ‘learned’ from the Spanish Flu
were put to the test – general NPIs like isolation, quarantine, masking up, physical
distancing, shutting down public celebrations and events (22,25), etc. Public health
theorized that a faster response would likely slow spread, leading to a faster return to
“normal” life, but something got in the way of successful implementation, leading officials
to question why their methods weren’t effective. Similar to the 1918 Flu, as documented
in the Latrobe Bulletin in October of 1918, individuals were “hopeful that if ‘appropriate
measures were followed, everyone [would] likely return back to work in a couple of weeks
(35).’” While that would have been ideal, that couldn’t have been further from the truth.
Differing mask and physical distancing recommendations between the WHO and the CDC
confused the American public, spurring concern over the truthfulness of their claims.
Though concerning, this was not the first time that the WHO and CDC, both highly
prevalent world public health organizations, had apparently contradicted one another. It
happened recently with the Zika virus (36), and again with the COVID pandemic.
Obviously, these different committees composed of many individuals (from the U.S. and
other countries across the world) were doing their best to provide recommendations to the
public, but their juxtaposing recommendations hindered their cause, rather than assisting
them in creating a successful public health response to the virus. Distrust in the public
health officials dictating public policy also inhibited successful implementation, as well as
vaccination rates when a vaccine was finally created (37). The politicization of the
pandemic, as well as the growing distrust in government officials, rendered their cause
even more bleak. Although technological advances enabled information about the virus
and subsequent vaccine to be proliferated faster than any previous pandemic, that same
information was misconstrued and manipulated through the same means, resulting in
increasing distrust and the creation of group echo chambers, where individuals became so
entrenched in their own viewpoints that they only listened to those who agreed with them
(37-44). Polarizing opinions and the unpredictable social response to these policies led to
chaos.

3.D.2 Textual Analysis of Newspaper Headlines from the COVID-19 Pandemic

(68)
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Upon first glance, it’s difficult to see the patterns of reporting from the first headline
published by the Times in January of 2020 – the article isn’t representative of the trends as
a whole. Further examination revealed the trends that were not so easily extrapolated from
a single glance.
The overall reporting trends resembled those of the AIDS epidemic – favoring socialfocused, individual-focused articles that assumed a contentious, polarized populous. The
COVID-19 sample scored a 3.20 on the first scale, demonstrating a slight favor towards
social-focused, rather than public health focused articles. A similar trend was seen in the
policy-focused versus person-focused category, as COVID-19 reports averaged a 3.14 on
that scale. The differentiating feature of the COVID-19 pandemic reporting was in the
amount of discord found in the article headlines. The sample scored, on average, a 3.76,
much higher than either of the previous pandemics. Why was that?
One article headline gives a glimpse into a possible reason:
(69)

The most modern and visible of the pandemics of the last century, the COVID-19 pandemic
was different from the others. While it’s difficult to determine if it was truly more
controversial than the others, the data suggests that even if the virus itself wasn’t
controversial, the social polarization of the public certainly was. Further from unanimity
as ever, the reports from the height of the pandemic reflect the clear societal discord and
disharmony, as seen below.
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4. COMPARATIVE SELECTION OF NEWSPAPER ARTICLES FROM
PANDEMICS
Figure 4: Comparative data from textual analysis of New York Times headlines

Insights from the quantitative and qualitative textual analysis of headlines from the
pandemics revealed clear trends for the reporting of the last century. In order to normalize
these trends and determine whether or not they were statistically significant, an ANOVA
test was first performed on each set of data. The results from this test revealed that the
differences were, in fact, significant. The P value for the values on the Research Focus v.
Social Focus scale was 6.94E-26, for Unanimity v. Discord the value was 2.83E-58, and
for Policy v. Person the P value was 5.74E-45. Following the ANOVA test, the standard
deviations of each data set were found (as seen in the table above), and a T test was
performed. T tests revealed that the difference in the results from each comparison were
highly significant, with the exception of the HIV and COVID data in the Policy v. Person
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analysis. The mean values for those two categories, 3.20 and 3.13, respectively, were too
close together to be statistically significant, resulting in a T score of 0.222.
Rather than provide detailed commentary on the trends, I found it was more helpful and
effective to let the reports speak for themselves. The following articles, representative of
the tone of the reports, provide evidence of the reporting trends, while reflecting on the
‘lessons’ learned during each of the pandemics.
On Sunday, November 17th, 1918, in the midst of the ongoing pandemic, the New York
Times printed the following article, titled, “Epidemic Lessons Against Next Time,”
reminiscent of the lessons they had learned from their experience, and detailing elements
of both the public and social health responses. Little did they know that the pandemic would
continue on for another year and a half. Note the unity portrayed in both the public health
response and the social response:

“THE epidemic of Spanish Influenza has been officially declared to
be a thing of the past and the city can now take stock of its
experience. That it was the worst experience of its kind that we have
ever had every one knows. But how did the city meet it? Why were
some things done and other things left undone? Did New York’s
death rate compare well or ill with that of other large cities? And
what good results, in the way of lessons for the future, has the
visitation had?...
‘At the beginning of the Summer we learned that there was Spanish
Influenza in Europe, and some of us, who had been through the
epidemic of grip in 1880-90, knew what to expect,’ Dr. Copeland
said. ‘That, as it happens, was my first year of medical practice. I
was an interne in a hospital and I had sharp personal recollections
to tell me what an epidemic would mean. The first thing that was
done here was to work for the protection of the civil population
against infection from cases of Influenza coming in on ships. Early
conferences were held between the Health Officer of the port and
myself to work this matter out…
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‘By the middle of September we began to have a considerable
number of cases, and on Sept. 18 the Board of Health made
Influenza and pneumonia reportable diseases – that is, they were
included among the infectious diseases that must be reported to the
Board of Health. But, of course, it took a good while to get this
information to all the physicians, and it was several days before
satisfactory reports began to appear…
‘In meeting the situation when it got here we did a number of
unconventional things, and we did not do several conventional
things that were done elsewhere,’ Dr. Copeland said. ‘But let us see,
first, about the organization of the city. It was a matter of thoroughgoing co-operation. Every function of the Health Department which
did not contribute to the prevention of the disease or the care of its
victims was for the time being suspended, or subordinated. And
social and remedial agencies throughout the city worked with us.
The whole city was districted and centres were opened everywhere
– about 130, in round numbers – where nurses, nurses’ aids, and
volunteer workers reported for emergency duty, where ambulances
and supplies were ready for service, and where an elastic reserve of
workers of all kinds could be got hold of and sent wherever needed.
In this office four extra telephones were installed and a staff called
in to receive calls; In this way we operated as a central clearing
house that could send out nurses, ambulances, supplies, whatever
was needed, to any part of the city, through these community
centres…
‘The first thing that was done almost everywhere but New York was
to close the schools,’ he said, ‘and the theatres and all places of
public assemblage. In some communities they went so far as to
prohibit small stores from admitting more than three persons at a
time. All sorts of extreme and absurd methods were adopted in some
places. I do not mean to criticize the closing of schools and theatres
elsewhere,’ he added. ‘They may have been just the right things to
do in those places; I don’t know their conditions. But I do know the
conditions of New York, and I know that in our city one of the most
important methods of disease control is the public school system.
‘…[The theatres] were made centres of public health education; and
I want to say that from the beginning I had the cordial co-operation
of the owners and managers, who carried out to the letter the
instructions of the Health Department. In every theatre, before the
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entertainment began, some one appeared before the curtain and
explained the danger of infection from coughing and sneezing, and
warned them that any one that did not obey the instructions in that
matter would be ushered to the door. The audience was told how
Influenza spreads and how to protect themselves and others. In the
movie theatres these things were flashed on the screen.
Furthermore, no place was permitted to admit more people than it
had seats for; crowding was thus avoided in the theatres.
‘My purpose in doing it all in this way, without issuing general
closing orders and making a public Flurry over the situation, was
to keep down the danger of panic,’ Dr. Copeland went on to explain.
‘I felt that one of my prime duties was to keep this city from going
mad on the subject of Influenza. My aim was to prevent panic,
hysteria, mental disturbance, and thus to protect the public from the
condition of mind that in itself predisposes to physical ills. I
attempted to maintain the morale of New York City. I wanted people
to be able to go about their business without constant fear and
hysterical sense of calamity. Of course the necessary warnings were
issued against crowds etc, and the necessary things were done.
‘All along, my greatest anxiety was over the matter of
transportation. After all, there is not much danger from theatres and
churches; people who are sick do not go much to the theatre or to
church. But sick people do go to work.
‘I have no doubt that the most dangerous means of transmitting
disease was the subway. Undoubtedly there were many cases of
Influenza in the cars, and these infected others. Many a man who
was sick must have felt that he had to go to work, and must have
taken his disease into the subway and spread it to other people
without realizing what he was doing. It isn’t necessary to point out
the peculiar difficulties of transportation in New York, with its
north-and-south throngs. You might as well try to cut off the main
artery of the body as to close the subway, however. We had to deal
with conditions as they were. So we put into operation the
overlapping system that everyone knows about to distribute the
subway crowds. I needn’t say anything more about that – as I said,
everyone knows about it. But I do want to mention what I think was
the most interesting thing about it – the cordial acquiescence of the
people in what could not fail to mean actual inconvenience… ‘Of
course, there was also a wide distribution of health information –
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the Public Health Service’s bulletin on Influenza and similar
pamphlets prepared here and much educational work was done…
With the passing of the epidemic itself the tasks that it laid upon the
community are, of course, not over… ‘For the necessities of aftercare, we are continuing the health districts and centres,’ Dr.
Copeland said, ‘primarily in accordance with the plan of the
community councils. There must be repeated examinations of
Influenza victims to guard against tuberculosis and all other
secondary diseases of the lungs, heart, and kidneys. Through the
settlement workers, who have given such noble and efficient aid, we
hope to reach every person who might be affected or need care..
‘Now as to how serious the epidemic may be said to have been here,’
Dr. Copeland added, ‘there are a few things that I want to point out.
This was a very terrible experience – we need not be reminded of
that. But here are some figures that offer a significant comparison
about New York: At the end of the fourth week of the epidemic in
Boston, the death rate was 101 for each thousand of the population;
in the City of Washington, it was 109; in Baltimore, 149; in
Philadelphia, 158; in New York City 50. That is a very fine record
by comparison. And why did we have such a record as that? Because
this city has had an efficient Health Department for twenty years;
because for those years, there has been a constant effort to
popularize the conditions that made for health; because during and
since the first anti-tuberculosis campaign there has been constant
insistence on the necessity for ventilation; we have improved our
tenement-house laws; bad as they are at times, our streets are clean
in the main – and in and out-of-the-way parts of the city clean, and
reeking sellers and filth- breeding places have been wiped out. The
fact that the death rate was kept down so low, and that the epidemic
did not assume more alarming proportions, is a wonderful tribute to
the city’s health control in years past.
‘ I would hesitate to say this,’ the Health Commissioner added, ‘if it
were not so obvious that what I am talking about is not my own work,
but that of my predecessors. I have not been here long enough to
make it possible for anyone to think that this was my work! It is work
that has been going on for years and it is something for the city to
be proud of’ (28).”
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Representative of the trends seen in other passages from the early 20th century, this article
demonstrates the unity that was so evident in the public health and social responses of the
1918 Influenza Pandemic. The sense that society was working towards a common goal,
regardless of the political stance or opinions of individual citizens, was a hallmark
characteristic of the times, and juxtaposes the style of writing from the AIDS and Covid19 pandemics.
On November 15th, 1992, over a decade after the discovery of AIDS, Dr. William A.
Haseltine, the chief of human retrovirology at Harvard University’s Dana-Farber Cancer
Institute, prepared to give a speech to the French Academy of Sciences. A portion of his
speech was adapted for the New York Times’ publication. From the title, his article conveys
the sense of desperation, hopelessness, and frustration that was common at the time.
Reporters attempted to humanize the disease (or those who had it), while uniting a divided
public sector using language suggesting that the only way they would get through the
pandemic was ‘together.’

“AIDS research is at the cutting edge of discovery in many fields.
The effort worldwide is characterized on the whole by close,
collaborative relations.
Why then does the future look so bleak? The answer is that given
what we know today, it cannot be predicted when, or even if, an
effective treatment will be developed and when, or even if, a vaccine
will be developed.
The nature of the AIDS virus demands that medical intervention be
designed to treat rather than cure the disease. Infection involves most
of the major organs. Infection cannot be eliminated from these
organs without destroying the infected cells.
Drugs that slow the virus’ progress have been developed. To date
such drugs have had limited effect for two reasons. The virus
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develops resistance to the drugs, and the drugs have unacceptable
long-term toxicity.
The greatest hope for a solution to the AIDS epidemic is a vaccine,
but obstacles stand in the way. Once infection is established, the virus
is not naturally eliminated. It changes as it grows. The most common
route of infection is exposure of sexual membranes to H.I.V. present
in vaginal and seminal Fluids. It has been difficult to induce longlasting immune protection at the surface of mucous membranes.
We do not know in which field of research a breakthrough may come.
For this reason, I propose that each nation’s biomedical research
budget be doubled by 1995 and quadrupled by the year 2000. We
cannot rely on a medical miracle for salvation from AIDS. If such a
miracle does occur, it may be too late for many millions. Until that
day, it is the responsibility of individuals, acting singly and
collectively, to save themselves.
There is very little evidence to suggest that sexual behavior in any
part of the world has changed significantly in response to the
epidemic. The lessons of the past, most recently the 19th century
experience with syphilis, are not comforting.
Condoms have been shown to reduce the risk of infection by about
90 percent. It is our responsibility to make condoms available to
everyone, worldwide, at an affordable cost.
The risk of infection can also be reduced by testing a potential
partner for evidence of infection. Simple, reliable tests that only take
10 minutes to complete are now available. These tests require only a
drop of blood or a spot of saliva. They can be done at home. It is our
responsibility to provide simple AIDS tests at an affordable cost on
demand.
The ever-expanding population of immune-suppressed people with
AIDS serves as a launching pad for new, highly infectious diseases.
It is the responsibility of richer countries to provide resources to
poorer nations for education, condom distribution and AIDS testing.
We are united by the AIDS epidemic. The health of one nation is the
health of all. The epidemic makes it clear that we are our brother’s
keeper (45).”
It is likely that the most substantial, notable change in the writing published by the New
York Times during the AIDS pandemic was the sense of fear and desperation in the articles.
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The article above, “Don’t Bet on a Miracle,” conveys this sense of dread and of
hopelessness that AIDS research alone would not be enough to save the public. Although
the article references advances in AIDS research, it focuses primarily on the social aspect
of the pandemic, begging members of society to unite in the cause of AIDS, in order to
slow spread and limit viral transmission. These trends in reporting on the pandemics,
largely established during the 1980s, would shape the way reporters presented the Covid19 pandemic to the public.
An article written by Gina Kolata of the New York Times on October 14th, 2021, halfway
through the COVID pandemic, demonstrates the trends established in the AIDS reporting
of the 1980s and 1990s, reflecting the frustration and divisiveness of the public, as well as
their desperation for life to return back to ‘normal.’

“The skeletons move across a barren landscape toward the few
helpless and terrified people still living. The scene, imagined in a mid16th-century painting, ‘The Triumph of Death’ by Pieter Bruegel the
Elder, illuminated the psychic impact of the bubonic plague. It was a
terror that lingered even as the disease receded, historians say.
Covid-19’s waves of destruction have inflicted their own kind of
despair on humanity in the 21st century, leaving many to wonder when
the pandemic will end.
‘We tend to think of pandemics and epidemics as episodic,’ said Allan
Brandt, a historian of science and medicine at Harvard University.
‘But we are living in the Covid-19 era, not the Covid-19 crisis. There
will be a lot of changes that are substantial and persistent. We won’t
look back and say, ‘That was a terrible time, but it’s over.’ We will be
dealing with many of the ramifications of Covid- 19 for decades, for
decades.’
Especially in the months before the Delta variant became dominant,
the pandemic seemed like it should be nearly over.
‘When the vaccines first came out, and we started getting shots in our
own arms, so many of us felt physically and emotionally transformed,’
said Dr. Jeremy Greene, a historian of medicine at Johns Hopkins
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University School of Medicine. ‘We had a willful desire to translate
that as, ‘The pandemic has ended for me.’’
He added, ‘it was a willful delusion.’
And that is a lesson from history that is often forgotten, Frank
Snowden, a historian of medicine at Yale University, said: how
difficult it is to declare that a pandemic has ended.
It may not be over even when physical disease, measured in illness
and mortality, has greatly subsided. It may continue as the economy
recovers and life returns to a semblance of normality.
The lingering psychological shock of having lived in prolonged fear
of severe illness, isolation and painful death takes long to fade.
Some diseases, like the 1918 Flu, receded. Others, like the bubonic
plague, remained, smoldering. H.I.V. is still with us, but with drugs to
prevent and treat it. In each case, the trauma for those affected
persisted long after the imminent threat of infection and death had
ebbed.
If nothing else, the Covid-19 virus has humbled experts who once
confidently predicted its course, disregarding the lessons of history.
‘What we are living through now is a new cycle of collective dismay,’
Dr. Greene said — a dismay that has grown out of frustration with the
inability to control the virus, fury of the vaccinated at those who refuse
to get the shots and a disillusionment that astoundingly effective
vaccines haven’t yet returned life to normal.
No matter when or how pandemics dwindle, they change people’s
sense of time.
‘A pandemic like Covid-19 is a breach of the progressive narrative,’
that medicine is advancing and diseases are being conquered, Dr.
Greene said.
As the pandemic drags on, days merge into each other as time seems
to blur and slow down with no forward momentum.
In past pandemics, as today, strong anti-science movements hindered
public health and the waning of disease.
As soon as Edward Jenner introduced the first smallpox vaccine in
1798, posters appeared in England showing humans who had been
vaccinated ‘sprouting horns and hooves,’ Dr. Snowden said.
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‘In 19th-century Britain, the largest single movement was the antivaccine movement,’ he added. And with vaccine resisters holding out,
diseases that should have been tamed persisted.
But the difference between vaccine skeptics and pandemic
misinformation then and now, historians said, is the rise of social
media, which amplifies debates and falsehoods in a truly new way.
With H.I.V., Dr. Brandt said, ‘there were conspiracy theories and a
lot of misinformation, but it never had a broadcast system like Covid19.’
Other pandemics, like this one, were hobbled by what Dr. Snowden
calls ‘overweening hubris,’ prideful certainties from experts that add
to the frustrations of understanding how and when it will dwindle
away.
With Covid, prominent experts declared at first that masks did not
help prevent infection, only to reverse themselves later.
Epidemiologists confidently published models of how the pandemic
would progress and what it would take to reach herd immunity, only
to be proved wrong. Investigators said the virus was transmitted on
surfaces, then later said that, no, it was spread through tiny droplets
in the air. They said the virus was unlikely to transform in a
substantial way, then warned of the Delta variant’s greater
transmissibility.
‘We paid a heavy price for that,’ Dr. Snowden said. Many people lost
trust in officials amid ever-changing directives and strategies that
weakened the effort to control the virus.
Jonathan Moreno, a historian of science and medicine at the
University of Pennsylvania, said the end of Covid would be analogous
to a cancer that has gone into remission — still there, but not as
deadly.
‘You are never cured,’ he said. ‘It is always in the background’ (46).”
Pandemic reporting has changed over the past century. These articles, presented as
representative samples of the reporting trends from each pandemic of the century, have
demonstrated these changes.
It is with these ‘lessons’ in mind from the past pandemics that I will now conclude this
case study with my own ‘lessons’ from the textual analysis of the pandemics. We have
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heard the lessons from each individual pandemic. What do the lessons look like from all
three, collectively?

5. LESSONS FROM THE PANDEMICS
5.A Personal experiences
Given what we’ve been through since March of 2020, it’s hard to imagine that any other
pandemic has ever happened – at least not at this scale. The impact of a global shutdown
couldn’t be quantified. It was more than just the restaurants, sporting events, and economic
ripple effects. It was more than the loss of loved ones, or the way that those who hadn’t
died became even more distanced from each other due to restrictions on gathering together.
The pandemic exacerbated issues that had been brewing for some time. The CDC became
a topic you couldn’t talk about at Thanksgiving dinner, like religion or politics. Everything
was politicized and polarized. Our perceptions of others and their worth were somehow
tied to whether or not they were wearing masks, or how close they stood to us in the grocery
store. We forgot to see people for who they really are – humans. Polarization of ideas and
emotional and physical distancing increased exponentially as friends turned against
friends, and family against family.
These were my own experiences – subjective as they are. As I began a detailed textual
analysis into hundreds of newspaper articles from the past pandemics, I wasn’t sure of what
I would find. Were individuals in other generations less biased and polarized? Was it just
COVID-19, or were existing issues exacerbated in other pandemics, as well? Were
previous generations more submissive, willing to obey public health ordinances and
measures to prevent viral transmission? In the past, were reporters addressing concerns
about policy or politicians? Imperfect as it was, a subjective analysis of these questions
revealed some startling trends, suggesting that people, armed with technological advances,
are the true danger of pandemics.
5.B Takeaways from the textual analysis of the New York Times
Reporting in the New York Times has changed over the past century in two important ways.
The first, the invention and increased popularity of ‘opinion style’ articles, and the second,
the subject matters and tone of the reporting in non-opinion articles.
On September 21st, 1970, the first op-ed section was featured in the New York Times’
morning paper. Prior to this important change, opinion-style articles in the Times were
non- existent, meaning there were no opinion style articles reporting on the 1918 Flu
pandemic. The opinion articles in the HIV/AIDS era were not easily distinguishable from
the hard reporting, so these numbers required a detailed search through all the articles of
the Times. Within 1983 and 1985, the time frame for the HIV headline samples, the number
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of opinion articles about the pandemic had increased to 15. By the end of 1995, as the
pandemic was reaching its peak, the number of opinion articles referencing AIDS had
increased to 459. In just two years of the most recent pandemic, the number of opinion
articles on the pandemic had increased exponentially. Out of the 26,000+ articles published
about COVID-19 on the New York Times’ website, 3,387 of those were opinion articles,
easily distinguished from the Health Articles published online.
Additional research into these opinion-style articles revealed that the subject matter of the
opinion articles had changed, as well. Not a single opinion article from the HIV/AIDS era
directly addressed the President of the United States at the time or an elected official. From
January until April of 2020, there were 82 opinion articles under COVID that directly
called out a U.S. politician of some sort – a curious, but substantial change.
The changes to reporting in the New York Times was not limited to the opinion section
alone. As found in the textual analysis, the subject and sense of polarization and
politicization of the articles published in the Times evolved over the past century. The shift
from research-based, policy-based reporting to a unified audience during the 1918
Influenza Pandemic to a more social, person-based reporting style in the AIDS and
COVID-19 pandemic was startling. The trends suggest that pandemic reporting is driven
as much by people and social attitudes as it is by the viruses behind the pandemics. People
behave according to policy and inputs from social connections, not one or the other. Over
time, their connection to the social aspect of pandemics has been strengthened.
Social pressures impacted all pandemics, but the most recent was unprecedented in that
way. Certain factors that played a role in worsening pandemics in the past, like fear and
discord within the community, were exacerbated during COVID. I searched for a possible
explanation for the trends I had found, or something to contradict them. What I found was
alarming – the technological advances in communication over the past century seemed to
mirror the trends of discord and polarization in the public.
Although social and political polarization of ideas may have been an issue in the 1918
pandemic, the articles in the New York Times do not provide sufficient evidence to back
that claim. Quantitatively, the headlines consistently scored low on all scales, revealing the
research- driven, policy-driven nature of the time. By the time the AIDS pandemic had
been discovered, and technological advances had facilitated the exchange of information
and opinions, the newspaper headlines mirrored that change, scoring consistently higher in
all categories, evidence of a more social-focused, polarized society. The COVID-19
pandemic reflected the same trend, ranking even higher, evidence of increased discord
within the community.
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5.C Impact of technological advances
The technological advances of the past century, particularly the invention of social media
platforms, seem to have facilitated the trends seen in this analysis, making it even easier
for individuals to share their opinions and ‘information’ on all matters of social importance.
Researchers were wary of these changes, even before the COVID-19 virus was on their
radar. One year before the current COVID-19 pandemic started, public health officials
warned the public of the dangers of misinformation and manipulated information on social
media, calling it a “global public-health threat” (37). They predicted that the main reason
for a modern major viral outbreak would not be “due to a lack of preventive technologies,”
rather, “emotional contagion… [eroding] trust in vaccines so much as to render them moot”
(37). Their theory proved correct, as the main stumbling block for the implementation of
nonpharmaceutical interventions in the COVID pandemic was the public itself –
particularly, the propagation of “information” and opinions on social media platforms.
We’re a society founded on technology. Most of us haven’t lived without it. Our lives are
programmed – quite literally – in algorithms which attempt to match us with sources of
information that are most pleasing to us. It’s arguable that the biggest risk of using social
media is in the algorithms themselves, which are programmed to give us information that
we will like, not necessarily information that is true. We don’t see other viewpoints,
creating technological echo chambers that only confirm what we want to hear. The echo
chambers of the most recent pandemic proved to be particularly dangerous to the public
health response. Despite successful, proven vaccines, vaccination rates continued to drop
as distrust in vaccine technology increased (42, 47). Social media has not helped the case
for vaccines, or for unity within society. During the recent pandemic, Russian trolls and
bots spread misinformation, merely in an effort to polarize society even more than it
already is (48). Do you wear a mask or not? How much distance should you be leaving
between yourself and others in the grocery store? Where did the virus come from? What
are vaccines made of? Will they protect you? What does your neighbor think about the
issues? Society divided as the media played an even more important role in the pandemic.
Computers and smartphones have given the American public completely unrestrained,
unlimited access to all information, whether good or bad. Trends suggest that even with
the abundance of published articles on news sites, like the New York Times and other
reputable outlets, social media, public opinion, and extremely polarized news outlets and
opinion sections became the major news sources of the most recent pandemic, leading to
increased polarization and politicization.
Is there really a middle ground anymore?
In past generations, unencumbered by the influence of technology, it’s quite possible that
there was a middle ground. However, modern society, influenced heavily by technology
and social media, doesn’t seem to have as much of a middle ground as it did in previous
times. Fewer individuals seem to be looking for diverse, balanced news sources. We know
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the facts, and scientists have done countless studies into the data of the pandemics, but
social responses are not so easily graphed or predicted. They require a qualitative
assessment, not a quantitative one. It is likely that the most important lessons we have
learned from the pandemics that have plagued the last century have little to do with the
molecular structure, pathogenesis, or mortality rate of the viruses themselves. The biggest
threat isn’t the virus – it’s people – or rather, it’s the risk of forgetting that it is in our nature
to be tribal and partisan. Technologies of today play on and intensify this innate attribute,
resulting in rather inhumane behavior during pandemics. Technology has essentially
exacerbated issues that were bubbling just under the surface of the face of society for years.
People, unchecked and isolated, turned on one another behind virtual screens. Misinformed
citizens wielding opinions and false information like swords did more harm than good.
Vaccine hesitancy and distrust in governments, family members, and friends rose.
While there is often a one-size-fits-all solution to combat viruses, that type of solution
doesn’t exist to fix the damaged relationships, hurt feelings, and injurious contention that
results from pandemics, nor is it likely to work in our modern society. People behave
according to policy and inputs from social connections. Those social pressures impacted
all pandemics in some way, but the most recent was unprecedented in that way. There isn’t
an easy solution to convince individuals to trust in vaccines or in the scientists who spend
years engineering them. People aren’t that simple. We don’t have all the answers, but
hopefully we can recognize that our responses to pandemics aren’t quite as unique as we
believe, and we can do better in the future.
Future work
Confirmation of the results found in this case study would require additional research. The
first step would be a normalization of the data – and minimization of biases – found within
the textual analysis through the careful rating of a panel of additional researchers. Next, it
would be interesting and necessary to see if performing the same analysis on a different
newspaper source revealed the same trends, or differing ones. This step would likely
require working closely with other departments at Brigham Young University to engineer
an automated AI program. This program would ideally generate these ratings for each
article, in order to facilitate the process and enable larger sample sizes from multiple
newspapers.
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